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Abstract
Background: We performed an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of pandemic intervention strategies using a detailed,
individual-based simulation model of a community in Australia together with health outcome data of infected individuals
gathered during 2009–2010. The aim was to examine the cost-effectiveness of a range of interventions to determine the
most cost-effective strategies suitable for a future pandemic with H1N1 2009 characteristics.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Using transmissibility, age-stratified attack rates and health outcomes determined from
H1N1 2009 data, we determined that the most cost-effective strategies involved treatment and household prophylaxis using
antiviral drugs combined with limited duration school closure, with costs ranging from $632 to $777 per case prevented.
When school closure was used as a sole intervention we found the use of limited duration school closure to be significantly
more cost-effective compared to continuous school closure, a result with applicability to countries with limited access to
antiviral drugs. Other social distancing strategies, such as reduced workplace attendance, were found to be costly due to
productivity losses.
Conclusion: The mild severity (low hospitalisation and case fatality rates) and low transmissibility of H1N1 2009 meant that
health treatment costs were dominated by the higher productivity losses arising from workplace absence due to illness and
childcare requirements following school closure. Further analysis for higher transmissibility but with the same, mild severity
had no effect on the overall findings.
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Introduction
The 2009 influenza A/H1N1 pandemic has provided a unique
opportunity to examine the effectiveness of a range of interven-
tions used to lessen the number of those becoming infected, the
attack rate, using data collected during the pandemic. High quality
data collected during the period 2009–2010 has been used to
populate a detailed demographic and mobility simulation model of
an actual community of ,30,000 persons in Australia, creating a
model with high realism. In contrast, previous modelling studies
used to determine the effectiveness of pandemic interventions have
relied on post-pandemic estimations of the defining characteristics
of the pandemic. Data collected during the recent pandemic
include the reproduction number [1,2,3,4,5], serial interval
[1,2,5], age-specific attack rate profile [6] and health outcomes
of those infected, such as hospitalisation, intensive care and
mortality rates. The resulting models [7,8,9,10,11] have been used
to determine the effectiveness (in terms of attack rate reduction) of
interventions used in the period 2009-2010 together with
examination of other strategies which may be more effective. In
the case of this study we have used an individual-based simulation
model [12,13,14] together with health outcome data on influenza
patients in Western Australia during the pandemic period to
determine the cost-effectiveness of antiviral drug and social
distancing interventions. We have considered interventions
actually used in 2009-2010 together with other (combined)
intervention strategies to determine which are the most cost-
effective for a pandemic with H1N1 2009 characteristics. These
results are available to inform public health authorities as to which
intervention strategies are cost-optimal.
Antiviral drugs and school closure are considered as frontline
pandemic mitigation strategies to reduce the illness attack rate to a
low level, either to prevent an epidemic or to buy time for a
vaccine to be developed and distributed. Other social distancing
strategies such as community gathering and work place attendance
reduction are also recommended to control infection spread
[15,16,17,18]. The 2009 pandemic provides a unique opportunity
for public health authorities to practically review their pandemic
mitigation guidelines in the light of the limited success in
containing and controlling the pandemic. In some countries there
was hesitancy in the use of antiviral drugs; for example in
Australia, with one of the largest per capita antiviral drug
stockpiles prior to the 2009 pandemic, there was not a rapid
and comprehensive use of antiviral drugs for treatment and
prophylaxis. A number of studies [7,8,9,10,11] have reviewed the
effectiveness of the 2009 interventions (in terms of reduction in
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those used. However to determine which strategies are optimal it is
important to also determine which of the effective strategies are
also cost-effective.
In this study we have used actual hospitalisation, ICU treatment
and mortality data from influenza cases in Western Australia in
2009/2010 as the measure of pandemic severity, and used this
data to determine the total costs involved. We have evaluated the
cost-effectiveness of a wide spectrum of intervention strategies,
including limited duration school closure and a range of antiviral
strategies, singly and in combination. This comprehensive
economic analysis has allowed us to determine the most cost-
effective strategies applicable to a future influenza pandemic with
H1N1 2009 characteristics. As these characteristics relate closely
to seasonal influenza, with similar reproduction numbers of ,1.3
and similar severity in terms of case fatality rates, these results are
applicable more generally.
Methods
We used a detailed, individual-based simulation model of a real
community in the south-west of Western Australia (Albany) with a
population of approximately 30,000 to simulate the dynamics of a
pandemic with an illness attack rate and effective reproduction
number (R) similar to that of influenza A/H1N1 2009. Comparing
simulations with and without interventions in place allowed us to
determine the effect which a range of interventions have on
reducing the attack rate and on the health profile of each
individual in the modelled community. The outcomes of the
simulation model were then used by a health-care decision process
to determine health-care outcomes (hospitalisation, ICU treatment
and deaths) based on data collected during the H1N1 2009
pandemic. These health-care outcomes, together with cost data
drawn from the literature, were applied to a costing process, as
shown in Figure 1. These analyses determine the baseline
(unmitigated, i.e. without intervention) and mitigated (with
intervention) pandemic costs and thus permit us to determine
the cost-effectiveness of a range of intervention strategies,
including those used during the H1N1 2009 influenza pandemic.
Furthermore, they give guidance as to which intervention
strategies are the most cost-effective in terms of cost per case
avoided due to intervention usage.
Simulation Model
Our individual-based simulation model had been developed by
using census, state and local government data to construct a
human contact network involving households, schools, childcare
centres, workplaces and a regional hospital. Census data was used
to populate each household in our modelled community with
exact numbers of individuals, with their ages in one of 7 age
classes. These ages are used to allocate children to appropriate
schools and classes, and adults to workplaces using data on
workplaces and schools in the community. The age of individuals
is also used when modelling the disease profile in individuals where
we use age differential attack rate data for the 2009 pandemic,
obtained from the Western Australia Department of Health
(personal communication with Dr Gary Dowse).
The modelled community is represented as a dynamic contact
network which changes the spatial locations of individuals through
time. Individuals move from their households to schools,
workplaces and into the wider community during the day,
returning to home in the evening. The simulation mechanism
underpinning the model captures this changing contact pattern
twice per day with each day divided into 12 hour day/night cycles.
During each cycle the nominal location of every person was
determined and individuals occupying the same location were
assumed to come into potential infective contact. In addition,
community-wide interaction was modelled by assuming that active
individuals would contact other active individuals each day, with
contact being random but biased towards contact between people
with nearby home locations. We assumed that an average of one
new infection per day was stochastically introduced into the
population during the whole period of the simulations. This model
was previously developed to determine the effectiveness of social
distancing and vaccination measures for a possible future H5N1
pandemic [12,13,14] and was subsequently used to examine
antiviral and school closure interventions which were employed in
the H1N1 2009 influenza pandemic [7,8,9].
We have further refined this model to reflect the biology of the
A/H1N1 2009 influenza virus strain according to information
available in 2010 [5]. Transmission of infection between infectious
and susceptible individuals who came into infective contact was
resolved stochastically. The probability of transmission was
calculated as a function of the state of the infectious (Ii) and
susceptible (Is) individuals involved at the time of contact, as given
by:
Ptransmission Ii,Is ðÞ ~b|Susc Is ðÞ |Trans Ii ðÞ |AVF Ii,Is ðÞ
Each factor contributing to the transmission probability is
described in [7,8,9]. The basic transmission probability (b),
capturing the infectivity of the virus strain, was chosen to give
an unmitigated epidemic with an effective reproduction number R
of 1.2 [5]. We examined a wide range of intervention strategies
such as school closure, antiviral drugs treatment and prophylaxis,
workplace non-attendance (WP – a 50% reduction in workplace
attendance) and community contact reduction (CCR – a 50%
reduction in community contact) both individually and in
combination. Some of the intervention strategies were applied
during the H1N1 2009 influenza pandemic in various countries,
while some are examined to determine their potential cost-
effectiveness when used in containing and controlling a future
influenza pandemic. A detailed description of each modelled
intervention strategy is given in [7,8,9,13].
Economic Model
In this study we used a health-care decision process to
determine the health outcomes (such as a family physician (GP)
visit, hospitalisation, ICU treatment and death: see Tables 1 and 2)
of the total modelled community using medical data related to
H1N1 cases during the 2009 pandemic. This model took the
outcomes of our individual-based simulation model, which capture
the infective profile of each individual in the community; that is,
who was infected, when and by whom. As each individual is in one
of 7 age classes, age-specific probabilities which relate to each
possible health outcome (such as those listed above) of those
infected are also taken as input. These age-specific probabilities
were estimated using data from the Department of Health,
Western Australia (personal communication with Dr. Gary
Dowse). The output of the health-care decision process thus
defines the severity of a pandemic in terms of the proportion of the
population needing medical attention, the proportion being
hospitalised, the rate of ICU admission and the mortality rate.
We focused on determining the total economic cost to society
incurred during an influenza pandemic. Total costs involve both
direct health-care costs (e.g. the cost of medical attention due to a
GP visit, or for hospitalisation) and costs due to productivity loss.
Pandemic Influenza Mitigation Cost
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together with those due to interventions such as (partial) workplace
closure and child-care of an ill child. Pharmaceutical costs (e.g.
costs related to antiviral drugs) are also estimated. Productivity
losses due to death were discounted at 3% annually (which is a
standard discount used to express all future income as a present-
day value) and all costs are reported in 2010 US dollars using the
consumer price index adjustments [19].
In our baseline unmitigated pandemic scenario the total
hospitalisation cost is measured by summing age-specific hospital-
isation costs. We estimated age-specific hospitalisation costs by
multiplying the average cost per day by average length of stay for
each age group. We assumed an average hospitalisation cost of
$1042 US dollar per day [20,21]. We also calculated costs for
intensive care unit (ICU) treatment using the same method. The
costs of treatment and length of stay in hospital (both ICU and
non-ICU) which are used in establishing the overall cost of
unmitigated and intervention mitigated epidemics in the modelled
community are given in Tables 1 and 2. We further estimated the
consultation fee of a general practitioner (GP) physician visit for
each influenza case at $106.97 [20]. Note that all costs are based
on US sources and given in 2010 US dollars.
Productivity loss due to death was calculated from the net
present value of future earnings for an averaged-aged person in
each age group. It was estimated by multiplying age-specific
death in each age group by average earning expectancy in years
and by average annual income. We also estimated productivity
losses due to illness and interventions (e.g. due to child-care
resulting from school closure, workplace non-attendance etc.)
multiplying average wages by work-days lost due to illness and
interventions. The number of work-days lost were determined
from the day-to-day outbreak data generated by our individual-
based simulation model. We estimated the cost of school-days lost
due to school closure interventions by multiplying average daily
cost in a school per student by the number of school-days lost
obtained from the simulator. The assumed values of a weekly
wage of a working person and the daily cost per student in a
school were $836 and $19.22 [22,23] respectively; these school
costs cover additional teaching needed to ‘‘make up’’ missed
classes due to absence.
Figure 1. Schematic presentation of methodology.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022087.g001
Table 1. Age-stratified health-care decision model and cost analysis parameters.
Parameter name Age Groups Source
0–5 6–17 18–64 65+
P(M|S)
1 0.013 0.036 0.031 0.002 Calculated from WA Health Data
P(H|S)
1 0.0006 0.002 0.002 0.00009 Calculated from WA Health Data
P(I|S)
1 0.00006 0.0002 0.0002 0.000009 Calculated from WA Health Data
P(D|S)
1 0.00002 0.00006 0.00005 0.000003 Calculated from WA Health Data
Average life-expectancy (years) 76.16 67.88 39.7 14.9 [23]
Average hospital stay (days) 4 days 4 days 4 days 4 days [21]
Average ICU stay (days) 7 days 7 days 7 days 7 days [25]
1Table shows probability of health care outcome conditional on symptomatic illness (S). Health care outcomes: M – general practitioner visit, H – hospitalization, I –
intensive care unit admission, D – death.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022087.t001
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antiviral course together with administration and dispensing costs
of $31.22 per course [20]. We used 2010 US dollar values in
determining total costs to make our results readily convertible to a
wide range of countries. All costs are based on US sources. In the
discussion section we comment on alternative sources of health
care and economic cost data.
Results
The main outcomes of our study are shown in Figure 2 and
Table 3 as an average of 40 realizations of each epidemic that
have been simulated using our individual-based simulation
model. The total cost of an unmitigated (baseline) pandemic
and each intervention mitigated pandemic scenario have been
described as a cost in million dollars ($m) per 100,000 individuals.
The (symptomatic) illness attack rate is presented as a % of the
population. The percentage reduction from the baseline illness
attack rate due to each intervention and the cost (in $) for each
symptomatic case averted are also given in Table 3. The
strategies which give the lowest range of costs per symptomatic
case prevented are those costing less than $1000 (per case
averted); these intervention strategies are highlighted in bold in
Table 3.
In Figure 2 the illness attack rates for each intervention strategy
considered are shown to range from 2.4% (SD – standard
deviation - 0.37) to 8.5% (SD 1.1) while that of the unmitigated
attack rate is 13% (SD 0.9). The total costs of a particular strategy
are superimposed on each attack rate column and indicated by a
cross. Figure 2 groups the simulated intervention strategies in six
different clusters (from cluster A to cluster F). A captures the single
baseline (unmitigated) scenario, cluster B groups individual school
closure (ISC) scenarios, cluster C groups solely antiviral drug based
scenarios, cluster D groups combined antiviral and limited
duration school closure scenarios, cluster E combines social
distancing strategies such as workplace non-attendance (WP) and
community contact reduction (CCR) with school closure and
antiviral drug strategies, cluster F groups certain combinations of
school closure and social distancing strategies. We assumed WP
(50% reduction in workplace attendance) and CCR (50%
reduction in community contact) were effective for 4 weeks unless
stated otherwise. In our analysis an intervention strategy is
considered cost-effective if it can significantly reduce the illness
attack rate with a lower total cost compared to the unmitigated
pandemic scenario and to other intervention strategies. Highly
cost-effective strategies may be deemed to be those where the cost
per symptomatic case prevented are less than a thousand dollars
($1000).
Baseline, unmitigated pandemic scenario
In the absence of interventions our simulated baseline epidemic
had an effective reproduction number R of 1.2 and an illness
attack rate of 13% (SD 0.9), closely matching estimates of the
H1N1 2009 influenza pandemic [5]. Similar estimates for H1N1
2009 have been found in other settings [4] and coincide with
transmissibility estimates for seasonal influenza which uses data
from a number of countries [24]. The simulated unmitigated
epidemic resulted in a cost of $6.26 million per 100,000
individuals. We report total costs in $m (million dollars) per
100,000 individuals throughout this paper.
Effective interventions for mitigating a pandemic with
H1N1 2009 characteristics
Our results suggest a set of intervention strategies as being
highly effective in terms of reducing the attack rate from the
unmitigated scenario of 13% (SD 0.9) to between 2.4% (SD 0.37)
to 3.5% (SD 0.58). Here the baseline attack rate is reduced by
81.5% to 73.2% respectively. These highly effective interventions
are a) continuous school closure (cluster B); b) T+H+E which is the
use of antiviral drugs for Treatment and for Household and
Extended prophylaxis (cluster C); c) the combination of school
closure with antiviral strategies (T+H and T+H+E) (cluster D); d)
individual school closure (ISC) for 2 weeks together with
workplace and community contact reductions of 50% (WP+CCR)
and the T+H+E antiviral strategy (cluster E); e) continuous school
closure with continuous WP (cluster F).
We also determined that the total cost of those effective
interventions ranged from $6.1m to $103m (see Figure 2 and
Table 3). This highlights a significant difference in costs associated
with the strategies which are the most effective in reducing the
illness attack rate. The lowest attack rate of 2.4% (SD 0.37) (with
an 81.5% reduction in cases) resulted from the ISC 2 week-
s+WP+CCR+T+H+E strategy (cluster E) which has a total costs of
$21.3m ($2007 per case prevented), which is neither the most
expensive nor the most cost-effective strategy.
Cost-effective interventions for mitigating a pandemic
with H1N1 2009 characteristics
Antiviral drug strategies combined with limited duration school
closure result in attack rates ranging from 2.7% (SD 0.4) to 3.2%
(SD 0.57) (see Figure 2, cluster D) compared to the 13% (SD 0.9).
For example a strategy of 2 weeks school closure combined with
the T+H antiviral strategy costs $6.2m with a resulting attack rate
of 3.2%. By contrast, the addition of an extra 6 weeks of school
closure used by the ISC 8 weeks+T+H strategy costs $7.7m with a
resulting attack rate of 3.1% (SD 0.42).
The use of an Extended antiviral prophylaxis strategy compared
to a Treatment and Household only prophylaxis strategy (that is
T+H+E compared to T+H) increases costs slightly but reduces the
overall attack rate. For example the ISC 2 weeks+T+H+E strategy
has costs of $6.5m compared to the cost $6.2m for ISC 2
weeks+T+H with a corresponding reduction in attack rate. Similar
patterns are also found for 4 weeks and 8 weeks school closure
when combined with the antiviral strategies.
The combination of antiviral drug strategies together with school
closurestrategiesarefoundtobethemost-costeffective (seeTable3,
cluster D) in terms of the cost per case prevented, for a pandemic
with H1N1 2009 characteristics. Those interventions cost between
$632 and $777 per case averted. Closing schools for 2 weeks (ISC 2
weeks) coupled with case treatment with antivirals and prophylaxis
for household contacts (T+H) gives the minimum cost of $632 per
case prevented, when compared to other strategies. Starting with
Table 2. Cost analysis model parameters.
Cost analysis assumptions Values in US$ Source
Average wages (per week) $836 [23]
Average cost for school closure
(per day per student)
$19.22 [22]
Average GP visit cost $106.97 [20]
Average hospitalization cost (per day) $1042 [20]
Average ICU stay cost (per day) $2084 assumed
Antiviral cost per course $24.81 [20]
Antiviral dispensing cost per course $31.22 [20]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022087.t002
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duration of school closure or an extension of the antiviral
prophylaxis regimen to contacts beyond the household (to the
T+H+E strategy) each give a limited increases in cost per case
averted but are still cost effective (see Table 3, cluster D).
Impact of antiviral drugs strategies without social
distancing
Antiviral drug strategies such as T, T+H and T+H+E result in
attack rates of 7.6% (SD 1.07), 4.6% (SD 0.83) and 3.5% (SD 0.58)
respectively when compared to the unmitigated attack rate of 13%
(SD 0.9). These strategies give a significant reduction in the
unmitigated attack rate (in the range of 42% to 73%) with very
similar overall costs in the $5.9m to $6.1m range. These costs are
lower than the ‘‘do nothing’’ baseline cost of $6.26 m. These
antiviral drug strategies are therefore cost-effective with case
averted costs of $1109, $701, $641 per individual for the T, T+H
and T+H+E respectively (see Table 3, cluster C).
Impact of duration on the effectiveness and cost of
school closure intervention
While school closure only strategies are both less effective (in
reducing the attack rate) and less cost effective when compared to
combining them with the antiviral strategies (see cluster B
Figure 2. Cost-effectiveness of intervention strategies. Cost effectiveness is shown in terms of illness attack rate (%) and cost in million dollars
per 100,000 population. Intervention strategies are abbreviated as follows: ISC – individual school closure, T – antiviral treatment, H – household
antiviral prophylaxis, E – extended antiviral prophylaxis, WP – 50% workplace closure (4 weeks if no duration is stated), CCR – 50% community contact
reduction. ‘‘cont.’’ refers to continuous school or workplace closure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022087.g002
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school closure is of significance. Increasing the duration of closure
increases the effectiveness of the overall attack rate reduction but is
increasingly less cost-effective; with per case prevented costs rising
from $1308 to $3476 as closure periods increase from 2 weeks to
continuously (see Table 3, cluster B).
2 weeks and 4 weeks school closure strategies cost $5.9m ($1308
per case averted) and $6.6m ($1372 per case averted) resulting
from attack rates of 8.5% (SD 1.1) and 8.2% (SD 1.03)
respectively. Increasing the duration to 8 weeks or continuously,
also increases the total costs up to $11.6m ($1868 per case averted)
and $34.1m ($3476 per case averted) with attack rates of 6.8% (SD
0.74) and 3.2% (SD 0.46) (see Table 3 and Figure 2, cluster B).
Impact of social distancing strategies on the
effectiveness and cost
Our results indicate that school closure combined with further
social distancing measures (reduction in workplace attendance and
community contact by 50%) and antiviral drug strategies are
effective, giving attack rates of 4.1% (SD 0.63), 2.8% (SD 0.49)
and 2.4% (SD 0.37) (see Figure 2 and Table 3, cluster E) but are
not cost-effective. The overall cost of these strategies is
approximately $22m and the cost per case prevented ranges
between $2007 and $2502.
The most costly strategy is that of continuous school closure
together with continuous 50% workplace non-attendance (WP)
(see Table 3, cluster F). This strategy has the highest overall costs
of $103m and the highest case prevented cost ($9894 per case).
However it is the second most effective, resulting in the second
smallest attack rate of 2.6% (SD 0.34) (a 79.7% reduction in cases
from the baseline). In contrast, the most effective strategy, with an
attack rate at 2.4% (SD 0.37) involves school closure of 2 weeks
coupled with the WP+CCR social distancing and T+H+E antiviral
strategies (see cluster E, Table 3). The cost of this strategy is $2007
per case averted in comparison.
Sensitivity to higher transmissibility
Our simulation results and analysis are based on H1N1 2009
pandemic data [5] (attack rate of 13% (SD 0.9) and effective
reproduction number R of 1.2) together with health outcome data
(such as required GP visits, hospitalisations, ICU treatment and
deaths) reflecting the (mild) severity of the pandemic observed in
2009/2010 in Western Australia (unpublished data, Department
of Health, Western Australia; personal communication from Dr
Gary Dowse). The results are therefore applicable to a future
influenza pandemic having severity and transmissibility charac-
teristics similar to that of H1N1 2009. We further extended our
simulations and analyses for scenarios with higher transmission
Table 3. Simulation and cost analysis results.
Cluster Intervention strategies
Illness Attack
Rate
2 (S.D.
3)
Percentage of
reduction of
baseline Illness
Attack Rate due to
intervention
Total cost in
million $ per
100,000
population
Cost in dollar ($) per
case prevented due
to intervention
A Baseline or Unmitigated pandemic 13.01 (0.9) 0 6.26 -
B ISC
1 2 weeks 8.5 (1.1) 34.2 5.9 1308.2
ISC 4 weeks 8.2 (1.03) 37.2 6.6 1372.1
ISC 8 weeks 6.8 (0.74) 47.5 11.6 1867.9
ISC Continuously 3.2 (0.46) 75.4 34.1 3476.1
ISC 2 weeks + WP
1 + CCR
1 7.5 (0.82) 42.1 21 3811.3
CT
1 7.6 (1.07) 41.7 6 1109.1
T + H
1 4.6 (0.83) 65.1 5.9 701.5
T + H + E
1 3.5 (0.58) 73.2 6.1 641.4
D ISC 2 weeks + T + H 3.2 (0.57) 75.7 6.2 632
ISC 2 weeks + T + H + E 2.8 (0.44) 78.8 6.5 636.6
ISC 4 weeks + T + H 3.1 (0.49) 75.8 6.7 676.1
ISC 4 weeks + T + H + E 2.7 (0.43) 79 6.6 640.2
ISC 8 weeks + T + H 3.1 (0.42) 76.3 7.7 777
ISC 8 weeks + T + H + E 2.7 (0.4) 78.8 7.3 708
E ISC 2 weeks + WP + CCR + T 4.1 (0.63) 69.1 22.3 2502.8
ISC 2 weeks + WP + CCR + T + H 2.8 (0.49) 78.1 21.2 2076.4
ISC 2 weeks + WP + CCR + T + H + E 2.4 (0.37) 81.5 21.3 2007.5
F ISC 2 weeks + WP 8.2 (0.97) 37.4 21.1 4386.7
ISC 2 weeks + CCR 7.5 (1.1) 42.4 5.7 1034.5
ISC 2 weeks + WP 2 weeks 8.5 (1.1) 34.5 13.6 3015.5
ISC cont.
1 + WP cont. 2.6 (0.34) 79.7 103 9894.3
1Interventions are abbreviated as follows: ISC – individual school closure, T – antiviral treatment, H – household antiviral prophylaxis, E – extended antiviral prophylaxis,
WP – 50% workplace closure (4 weeks if no duration is stated), CCR – 50% community contact reduction. ‘‘cont.’’ refers to continuous school or workplace closure.
2Illness attack rates are presented as a percentage of population.
3S.D. – Standard Deviation (in % of population) due to 40 simulation realizations for each scenario.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022087.t003
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1.8, but with the same (mild) severity characteristics, to determine
whether increasing the size of the population infected altered the
cost-effectiveness results. For both these higher transmissibility
scenarios we observed the same cost-effectiveness patterns as those
found with an R of 1.2. The attack rate and the total pandemic
cost of each intervention scenario for these higher transmission
characteristics are shown in Figure 3.
Discussion
We used a detailed individual-based simulation model to
simulate the dynamics of the H1N1 2009 influenza pandemic
using 2009/2010 pandemic data. A health-care decision process
model has been used to categorise the severity of the pandemic in
terms of health outcomes with a costing model used to present the
total and per case prevented costs of simulated pandemics under a
range of intervention scenarios. These cost outcomes give total
costs which include health care cost, the economic cost of lives lost
(productivity loss due to death), pharmaceutical costs (antiviral
purchase and distribution costs) and productivity loss due to illness
and interventions.
The largest contribution to the total cost of the no-intervention
strategy was found to be due to productivity losses which arise
from illness. This contributes approximately 91% of the total cost
in the total pandemic cost (see Table 4, cluster A) compared to
other costs (7% and 2% for productivity losses due to death and
health care costs respectively).
Most effective interventions
We find a set of intervention strategies which give the highest
reduction in attack rates compared to the unmitigated situation.
These are a) continuous school closure; b) the use of antiviral drugs
for Treatment and for Household and Extended prophylaxis; c)
the combination of school closure with antiviral strategies; d)
individual school closure for 2 weeks together with workplace and
community contact reductions of 50% and the T+H+E antiviral
strategy; e) continuous school closure with a continuous reduction
in workplace contact. However, these strategies give a wide
variation in total costs since the highest component of the total cost
is productivity loss due to illness and direct productivity loss due to
interventions (especially for the workplace non-attendance and
continuous school closure strategy). The social distancing measures
used in these strategies contribute the greatest component in total
costs while all predominantly antiviral drug based strategies are
substantially less costly.
Most cost-effective interventions
A key finding of this study for a future influenza pandemic
which has H1N1 2009 characteristics is that antiviral drugs
strategies which include treatment and prophylaxis (the T+H and
T+H+E strategies) are the most cost-effective, whether used with
or without the addition of a limited period of school closure. These
strategies give the cost per case prevented in the range of $632 to
$777. As the transmission and severity characteristics for H1N1
2009 used in this study relate closely to estimates for seasonal
influenza epidemics in the United States, France and Australia
[24], these results will also be applicable in a seasonal influenza
setting.
We also find that for all cost-effective intervention strategies
examined the highest component of the total cost is due to
productivity losses from illness and interventions. Losses due to
interventions include adults removing themselves from the
workplace to perform child care duties following school closure.
Compared to health care costs and productivity loss due to death,
these productivity losses constitute the highest cost burden (see
Table 4, cluster D). The use of antiviral drugs as the sole strategy
avoids some of the productivity losses which arise from (some of)
these interventions. Pharmaceutical costs and the cost of
distribution are less than the productivity losses due to a reduced
workforce for child care if school closure interventions are used as
an alternative.
The treatment and household prophylaxis antiviral strategy
coupled with 2 weeks of school closure has the lowest cost of $632
per case prevented when compared to all other strategies. This
cost-effectiveness result aligns with our previous findings that the
T+H antiviral strategy combined with 2 weeks school closure has
the highest number of prevented cases per antiviral drug course
used [7].
Coupling the T+H and T+H+E antiviral strategies with
extended school closure (e.g. of 4 weeks and 8 weeks) gives a
similar reduction in the attack rate compared to only 2 weeks
school closure with the same antiviral strategies, but with an
increase in cost per case prevented. This is due to increased
productivity losses of working adults required to look after school
children during the longer period of school closure.
As a sole intervention measure, all three antiviral drugs
strategies (T, T+H and T+H+E) result in small net cost savings
compared to the cost of an unmitigated pandemic. Significantly,
these antiviral strategies result in substantial illness attack rate
reductions of 42% to 73%. This substantial reduction in illness and
concomitant death has an overall cost in the $5.9m to $6.1m range
(per 100,000 population). These costs are similar to the baseline,
no intervention pandemic cost of $6.26m, but prevent significant
illness. This result becomes even more significant for a virus strain
which is more severe than H1N1 2009 with increased rates of
severe illness and death.
Short periods of school closure without other interventions (of 2
weeks and 4 weeks) are only slightly more costly (in term of total
costs) than the baseline but give a significant 34% to 37%
reduction in cases if optimally timed; the importance of when
school closure strategies should be activated to maximize their
effectiveness in discussed in [9]). While short-duration school
closure is a relatively cost-effective strategy at $1308 and $1372 per
case prevented the costs are higher than antiviral-only or
combined school closure and antiviral strategies.
The duration of school closure plays an important role in attack
rate reduction and in the total cost of a pandemic. Increasing the
duration of school closure trades off the overall cost against an
increase in attack rate reduction. Increasing the duration can
decrease the health care cost and the consequent productivity loss
due to death but results in a significantly greater increase in
productivity loss due to the interventions. As a result, the
continuous closure of schools strategy gives a high $3476 cost
per case prevented.
Combining workplace and community-wide contact reductions
(WP and CCR) with antiviral drug strategies (that is with T, T+H,
T+H+E) and limited period (2 weeks) school closure strategies are
highly effective in reducing the attack rate but with a
comparatively high cost compared to scenarios which lack this
extended, more rigorous social distancing. The health care costs
and productivity loss due to death are reduced due to the
application of antiviral drugs but the total cost is dominated by the
productivity loss arising from the social distancing interventions,
especially the workplace reduction strategy. When workplace
reduction (either continuously or limited) is coupled with school
closure, it causes the greatest increase in the overall pandemic cost
though it does give a significant reduction in attack rates. This
Pandemic Influenza Mitigation Cost
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 July 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 7 | e22087Figure 3. Cost-effectiveness of intervention strategies for higher transmission pandemics. Cost effectiveness for pandemics with higher
reproduction numbers (R of 1.5 and 1.8) is shown in terms of illness attack rate (%) and cost in million dollars per 100,000 population. Intervention
strategies are abbreviated as follows: ISC – individual school closure, T – antiviral treatment, H – household antiviral prophylaxis, E – extended
antiviral prophylaxis, WP – 50% workplace closure (4 weeks if no duration is stated), CCR – 50% community contact reduction. ‘‘cont.’’ refers to
continuous school or workplace closure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022087.g003
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access to antiviral drugs or if there is a significant risk of
development of antiviral drug resistant influenza strains.
Related research
There are only a limited number of related studies in the
published literature [20,22,25]. Two of these [20,22] use a
synthetic, small community-based simulation model somewhat
similar to our Albany model while [25] utilises a deterministic,
differential equation-based compartmental model. Our model
differs from these models in that it was built with the aim of giving
us the most faithful replication of the spatial contact structure,
mixing groups and community-wide random contacts found it an
actual population centre (Albany in Western Australia), given
available data sources including detailed census data [26]. To
achieve this high level of realism the Albany model therefore
encompasses significant complexity.
In the three related studies [20,22,25] different assumptions
have been made for the scenarios considered, such as pandemic
transmissibility (reproduction number and attack rate) and severity
(mortality rate) together with intervention strategies which differed
from each other and with our study. In the studies reported in
[20,22,25] the authors simulated influenza pandemics with higher
transmissibility and severity characteristics than that which
occurred with the H1N1 2009 pandemic and on which our study
is based, so making it difficult to directly compare our results.
In [20] the authors simulated a pandemic with an attack rate of
50% (a reproduction number of 2.0) and with severity based on
an estimation of the case fatality rate CFR of the 1918 pandemic
of 2.5%). This 1918 transmissibility and severity is much higher
than those of all subsequent influenza pandemics (1957, 1968,
2009). In [22] the authors simulated pandemics with attack rates
of 25% and 35% (and reproduction numbers 1.6 and 2.1) and
case fatality rates of 0.25% and 1%. In the third study [25] a
reproduction number of 1.7 with an illness attack rate of 31.1%
and case fatality rates of 0.75%, 1% and 2% for age groups 0–19,
20–64 and 65+ years respectively was considered. The transmis-
sibility and severity used in the above three studies are
significantly higher compared to our H1N1 2009 settings
(reproduction number of 1.2, attack rate of 13% and case fatality
rate of 0.0045%, which is estimated from [5] and Western
Australia Department of Health data (personal communication
from Dr Gary Dowse).
While the significant differences in the assumptions used in
these studies [20,22,25] make direct comparison with our results
difficult, we can observe general cost-effectiveness patterns with
them. In the two studies reported in [20] and [22] continuous
school closure was determined to be the most costly strategy of
those considered. When school closure was combined with other
strategies (such as antiviral drugs and adult and child contact
reduction in the workplace and wider community), the resultant
strategies were also shown to be costly. All antiviral drug strategies
Table 4. Breakdown of costs contributing to total pandemic cost.
Cluster Intervention strategy
1 Costs are expressed in million dollars per 100,000 population
Health care
cost
Productivity loss
due to death
Antiviral drugs and
distribution cost
Productivity loss
due to illness and
interventions
Total pandemic
cost
A Baseline or Unmitigated 0.15 0.40 0.00 5.72 6.26
B ISC 2 weeks 0.10 0.26 0.00 5.58 5.94
ISC 4 weeks 0.09 0.25 0.00 6.28 6.62
ISC 8 weeks 0.08 0.20 0.00 11.34 11.62
ISC Continuously 0.03 0.09 0.00 34.06 34.18
ISC 2 weeks + WP + CCR 0.09 0.23 0.00 20.76 21.08
CT 0.09 0.23 0.21 5.49 6.02
T + H 0.05 0.14 0.39 5.35 5.93
T + H + E 0.04 0.10 0.69 5.29 6.12
D ISC 2 weeks + T + H 0.04 0.09 0.27 5.83 6.23
ISC 2 weeks + T + H + E 0.03 0.08 0.56 5.83 6.51
ISC 4 weeks + T + H 0.04 0.09 0.26 6.34 6.73
ISC 4 weeks + T + H + E 0.03 0.08 0.56 5.97 6.64
ISC 8 weeks + T + H 0.03 0.09 0.26 7.31 7.70
ISC 8 weeks + T + H + E 0.03 0.08 0.56 6.62 7.29
E ISC 2 weeks + WP + CCR + T 0.05 0.12 0.11 22.03 22.31
ISC 2 weeks + WP + CCR + T + H 0.03 0.09 0.24 20.84 21.19
ISC 2 weeks + WP + CCR + T + H + E 0.03 0.07 0.50 20.71 21.31
F ISC 2 weeks + WP 0.09 0.25 0.00 20.75 21.09
ISC 2 weeks + CCR 0.08 0.23 0.00 5.46 5.77
ISC 2 weeks + WP 2 weeks 0.10 0.26 0.00 13.25 13.61
ISC cont. + WP cont. 0.03 0.07 0.00 102.98 103.08
1Interventions are abbreviated as follows: ISC – individual school closure, T – antiviral treatment, H – household antiviral prophylaxis, E – extended antiviral prophylaxis,
WP – 50% workplace closure (4 weeks if no duration is stated), CCR – 50% community contact reduction. ‘‘cont.’’ refers to continuous school or workplace closure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022087.t004
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when compared to continuous school closure.
In studies [20,25] the most cost-effective strategies were
determined to be pre-pandemic vaccination coupled with antiviral
treatment and prophylaxis, assuming a suitable vaccine is available
prior to pandemic onset. In the context of the 2009 pandemic,
where a vaccine was not available during the initial phases of the
pandemic, study [22] determined the most cost-effective strategy
as antiviral treatment and prophylaxis coupled with school closure
and a 50% reduction in contact in the workplace and community.
These results were obtained using a reproduction number of 2.1
and a CFR of 1%, both of which were much higher than later
estimates of the underlying transmissibility and severity of H1N1
2009. They also determined that for a virus strain with lower
transmissibility and case fatality rates the school closure compo-
nent of the above combined strategy causes it to be non cost-
effective.
Using the lower transmissibility and severity level found in the
2009 H1N1 2009 pandemic we also found that a continuous school
closure strategy was a costly intervention ($34.1m per 100,000),
giving the second highest cost among those which we considered.
We also simulated the economic impact of a 50% workplace
attendance reduction for 4 weeks and this strategy together with
continuousschoolclosuregave thehighestcostamongthesimulated
scenarios ($103m per 100,000). We found antiviral treatment and
prophylaxis strategies were highly cost-effective, a result which
confirms those of [20,22,25]. We additionally determined that
coupling our antiviral drugs strategies with limited duration school
closure are the most cost-effective strategies for mitigating a future
influenza pandemic having H1N1 2009 characteristics. We also
found that the use oflimited duration school closure isa significantly
more cost-effective strategy when compared to continuous school
closure. Strategies for optimising activation timing and the duration
of school closure are presented in [9].
We have use US based costs throughout, following the work of
Sander et al. [20], which based costs on US fee and price schedule
[27,28,29]. We considered alternative sources for United King-
dom and Australian productivity and health cost data, sources
which were used in analysis presented in [25,30,31]. We found
that when adjusted for inflation and converted to US dollars these
costs were comparable (within 20%) to the costs used in our model.
We also considered an alternative source of health care data for
the US (the proprietary MarketScan database) used in two
previous influenza economic analyses [22,32], which showed unit
health costs 4-6 times higher than the US, UK, and Australian
sources mentioned above. However, even these higher health care
costs would not have changed the relative outcome of the scenarios
presented in this paper. This is because total costs were dominated
by the productivity loss due to illness and intervention, with health
care costs contributing to only a minor degree. Note that while this
is true of the 2009 pandemic, which was relatively mild in terms of
health outcomes, the health-care cost component of a pandemic
with more severe health outcomes (e.g. with a higher hospitalisa-
tion rate) may be significant. In this case any analysis should take
into account the ratio of wages to health care costs, which might
differ significantly between countries and data sources (particularly
the US, which pays significantly more for health care services per
capita [33]).
Policy implications
Our simulation and cost analysis results give guidance to public
health policy makers as to the cost-effectiveness of a range of
(combined) intervention strategies which may be used during
future influenza pandemics with H1N1 2009 characteristics and
which are also applicable to seasonal influenza epidemics. From a
cost-optimal perspective the use of antiviral drugs are most
effective in reducing the cost and attack rates i.e. achieving
significant attack rate reductions. To improve effectiveness further
a purely antiviral drugs strategy may be combined with limited
duration school closure to reduce the attack rate further, but with
a slight cost increase. It should be noted that the effectiveness of
antiviral drug interventions are dependent on a) the delay
occurring between symptom onset and diagnosis and b) the
percentage of the infected population being diagnosed; a previous,
detailed analysis of these issues is presented in [8]. The use of
extreme social distancing e.g. long-term continuous school closure
or any form of workplace (WP) reduction (i.e. 50% reduction) is a
very costly choice of intervention but may be appropriate if there is
limited availability of antiviral drugs or if significant antiviral drug
resistance has developed.
As the results of this study are based on a population in a
developed country with a westernised health-care system, the
outcomes may not be applicable to populations in a developing
country, where populations may be less/more mobile and have
higher population densities.
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